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Code.'' 
As so modiiled the 
recover their costs on 
Gibson, C. J., 
and Schauer, 





said Carmen R Martinez 
section 402 of the Vehicle 
respondents to 
J., Traynor, 
was denied November 
[S. F. No. 19332. In Bank. Oct. 14, 1955.) 
ANTHONY v. STA'l'E BOARD 
OF EDUCATION et al., Appellants. 
[1] Licenses- Revocation- Iicaring.·-Unless a statute expressly 
provides to the contrary, a license cannot be revoked without 
a where the statute a quasi judicial 
determination by Hn administrative agency that there be cause 
for the revocation. 
[2] Code, § 12756, 
declaring that whenever the holder of any credential issue;d by 
the State Board of Education has been convicted of any sex 
[1] See Cal.Jur., 
[2] See Cal.Jur., 
McK. Dig. Refere.nccs: [11 61 7J .ul~>c.u:;c:;, 




that the credential should be revoked without the 
would be incident to 






is to be 
provides for revocation 
of sex offenses. 
&S 
intent 
§ 12756, which 
credelltials on conviction 
Id.-Teachers-Dismissal-Hearing.-In the revocation of a 
liccmse for the conviction of a crime under statutes 
like Ed. Code, § 12756, relating to revocation of tearhing 
credentinls on cmlViction of sex oiienses, there is no real 
necessity for the board to examine the resolve any con-
flicts in the and exercise its judgment in respect 
thereto, since there can be little dispute as to the conviction, 
which is a matter of public record, and the question of identity 
is not likely to arise. 
[5] Licen&es-Revocation.-Whether a conviction is of a crime 
of the character specified in statutes providing for the revoca-
tion of a lic0nse is a of law. 
[6] Id.-Revocation-Hearing.-.l:tevocations of licenses pursuant 
to statute on grounds of convictions of speeifled crimes con-
stitute ministerial action by the hoar<i rather than quasi 
judicial action. 
[7] Id.-Revocation-Hearing.-Where the mandatory duty is im-
posed on a board to revoke a license on the licensee's con-
viction of a specified crime, no hearing by the hoard is required 
or contemplated, and the licensee's constitutional rights are 
not violated. 
[8] revocation of 
!lredcntials hy the State Bmu·d of 
Ed. Code, § 12756, for com iction of s2x a dismissal 
the loeui sehool board follo1Ys as a matter of eourt~e because 
a goyeening board of a sc:.hool district shall ernploy in positions 
cr~d~ntL·:ds snf•h persons as have cred~~ntials ~ no 
would appear to be required in such a case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City anc1 County of San li'ranc.isco. H. A. van cler Zee, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Proceeding in mnnC!mnns to compel reinstatement of a 
teacher. J udgmellt grautiug writ, reversed. 
H. Duane for 
this mandamus pro-
the reinstatement of his state credentials 
He named as defendants the 
and commission on 
the board of education of the 
and others. 
tracher with permanent tenure employed 
by the San Francisco board; that no have been 
filed against him him of immoral or unprofessional 
conduct or any other ; that on September 28, 1953, 
the San Francisco board dismissed as a teacher with-
out a hearing, without '' against him, 
and without notice; that defendants acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in revoking his credentials. 
The superior court issued an alternative writ of mandate 
and in their return thereto anrl answer to the petition, defend-
ants admit plaintiil' the credentials issued by the 
state board and that he wafl a permanent tenure teacher in 
the San Francisco schools. They alleged that the state board 
did revoke plaintiff's credentials under the laws of California, 
particularly section ] 2011.7 1 of the Education Code, and 
pursuant to section 12756 of that code ;2 that by reason of 
"''Sex offense' as used in Sections 12107, 12756, 12785, 13001.3, and 
14002.3 of this code means any offen~e defined in Sections 266, 267, 285, 
286, 288, 2S8a, subdivision 3 or 4 of Section 261, subdivision 5 of 
Section 647, or 1 or :>. of Section 311 of the Penal Code; or any 
offense involving lewd and lasc·ivious conduct under Section 702 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code; or any to commit any of the 
above-mentioned offenses; or offense or attempted in any 
other state which, if or attempted in this State, would have 
been punishable as one or more of the above-mentioned offenses.'' (Ed. 
Code, § 12011.7.) 
""Whenever the holder of 
issued by the State Board of has been convicted of any sex 
offense as defined in Section 2011.7 the State Board of Education shall 
forthwith suspend the crcclcntiaL , or do,'umcnt. If the con-
viction is reversed and the holder is ac4,uitted W: the offense ill a DeW 
C.2d 
Exhibits were attached. 
copy of the minutes of the state board 
that certain named per-
have their credentials revoked be-
cause of conviction of sex offenses. A resolution was duly 
the credentials of all of these persons because 
of their conviction of sex offenses as defined in section 12011.7 
of the Education Code; the resolution was passed pursuant 
to section 12756 of that code. The other exhibits are certified 
of the proceedings in the municipal court in Los 
Angeles. One of these showed plaintiff had pleaded guilty 
to a violation of section 41.10 of ordinance 77000 of the city 
of Los Angeles.3 and that he was sentenced to 90 days in 
jail but that execution was suspended and plaintiff was 
placed on probation for two years, 20 days of which must be 
spent in jail. The other transcript showed that he had pleaded 
guilty to ''vagrancy lewd" for which he was fined $50. 
The order to show cause issued with the alternative writ 
came on for hearing, at which time defendants served and 
filed their return and answer. Plaintiff's counsel said he 
would put on his evidence and that the only question involved 
was that the revocation of plaintiff's credentials by the state 
board and his dismissal by the San Francisco board were had 
without charges, notice or hearing. He put plaintiff on the 
stand but nothing was developed that had not been admitted 
other than letters between the state board and plaintiff. It 
was stipulated that the credentials were revoked on October 
29, 1953. Defendants introduced into evidence a certified copy 
of the portion of the Los Angeles ordinance containing section 
41.10 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, S1lpra. Plaintiff 
filed no replication or answer to defendants' return and 
answer. The matter was submitted; judgment was for plain-
tiff. 'l'he judgment recited that the state board had revoked 
plaintiff's credentials; that the San Francisco board had dis-
trlal or the charges against him are dismissed, the board shall forthwith 
tenninnte the suspension of the credential, life diploma, or document. 
\Vhen the conviction becomes final or when imposition of sentence is 
suspended the board shall forthwith revoke the credential, life diploma, or 
document." (Ed. Code, ~ 12756.) 
3
'' No person shnll rent, let or assign any room or apartment with the 
understanding or belief that such room or apartment is to be used by 
the person or persons to whom it is sold, let, rented or assigned for the 
purpose of J,aving sexual intercourse with a person to whom he or she is 
not manicd, or for the purpose of performing or participating in any 
lewd act with any such pen;on.'' (Los Angeles Munici,pal Code, ~ 41.10.) 
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[45 C.2d 255; 288 P.2d 8621 
missed petitioner in excess of its and in abuse 
of its discretion; and ordered the reinstatement of tl<e creden-
tials and plaintiff to his position as teacher. 
Defendants assert that no notice or 
for a revocation of credentials 
should not be construed as .. Dr,ni»inn a Be-
of a combination of several we are compelled 
agree with defendants' assertion. 
Plaintiff relies on the rule of statutory construction that 
statutes should be construed so as to require a hearing. 
The most recent expression by this court on that ques-
is in Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 271 
[24(:i P.2d 656], where we said: " ... it has been held that 
unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary a license 
cannot be revoked without a hearing where the statute con-
templates a quasi judicial determination by the administrative 
agency that there be cause for the revocation; that because 
of reasons of justice and policy the statute will be interpreted 
to require a hearing. (Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Ca1.2d 226 
[195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826}: Carroll v. California Horse 
Racing Board, supra, 16 Cal.2d 164 [105 P.2d 110] ; LaPrade 
v. Department of Water & Power, supra, 27 Cal.2d 47 [162 
P.2d 13] ; Covert v. State Board of Equal1:zation, 29 Cal.2d 
125 [173 P.2d 545); Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 
26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816] ; Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 
197 [116 P. 732] ; Welch v. W acre, 161 Cal. 641 [119 P. 1080] ; 
Knights of Ku If.lux Klan, Inc. v. Fmncis, 79 Cal.App. 383 
[249 P. 539].)" 
[2] Here the statute ( § 12756, supra) provides that when 
a person has been convicted of any one of certain specified 
offenses the state board "shall" (ordinarily a mandatory 
word [Ed. Code, § 19] ) "forthwith" revoke the credential 
when the conviction becomes final. This implies that the 
credential should be revoked without the delay which would 
be incident to a hearing, probably for the reason that teachers 
convicted of sex offenses should be promptly removed from 
the classroom and contact with students. 
[3] Other related statutory provisions dealing with revo-
cation of credentials on grounds other than conviction of 
sex offenses make express provision for notice and hearing. 
Section 12752.1 of the Education Code requires notice and 
hearing for revocation under sections 12751 and 12752 which 
deal generally with revocation for cause, but makes no refer-




[4] In the revocation of a 
a specified crime statutes section 12756 there is no 
real necessity for the board to "examine the facts, resolve 
any conflicts in the and exercise its judgment in 
respect thereto" (Covert Stale Equalization, 29 
Cal.2d 125, 131 [ 173 P .2d ) . There can be little dispute 
as to the conviction as it a matter of public record and 
the question of is not likdy to arise. Whether 
the conviction is of a crime of the character specified is a 
question of law. Revocations on such constitute 
ministerial action the board rather than judicial 
action. For illustration. in with the disbarment of 
an attorney for conviction of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude it was said in In re 188 Cal. 701, 706 [206 P. 
990, 32 A.L.R. It will thus appear that the supreme 
court of the United States has in these cases definitely held 
that the legislature has power to that the conviction 
of a person of a crime, who had thereto been given the 
right or privilege of in the practice of either of 
said learned professions, should, facto, work a revocation 
of his right or privilege to lawfully continue so to do. If the 
legislature thus possesses this of power in respect 
to those members of such who have been convicted 
of crimes involving moral turpitude it may not be contended 
that the legislature has not also the power to provide that 
the record of such conviction shall constitute conclusive evi-
dence of the fact of such conviction for the purpose of having 
stricken from the rolls of such the name of the 
person who has been thus convicted of snch a crime ..•• In 
this view of the matter the essential fact working a depriva-
tion of the petitioner's and of continuing in 
thr practiee of his was not his conviction of a crime, 
nor was it the order of this court made automatically upon 
261 
but it was his 
made. simL::r view 
of In re Riccm·(· :. 182 CaL 675 
wherein the court says: 
" 'It has been understu)d that conviction of an 
attorney of a felony or misdemeaiL :· involving moral turpi-
made disbarment w iLhont any discretion in 
this court to other And this, we think, must 
be so, in view of section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which prescribes to be in such a 
case, viz., ''that the name of the shall be stricken from 
the roll of attorneys and counselors of the court, and that 
he be precluded from as snch attorney or counselor 
in all the courts of this '' while in other cases the judg-
ment ''may be according to the of the offense charged; 
deprivation of the to practice . . . or for 
limited period." 'vVe do not see how the legislature could 
have more clearly expressed its detrrmination that the only 
penalty in such a case is permanent disbarment. And cer-
tainly it would not be a wise rule that would invest the court 
with discretionary power in a matter where the sole evidence 
upon which it acts is a certified copy of a record of conviction.' 
"In the case of In re Shepard, 35 CaLApp. 492 [170 P. 
, the involved in this proceeding arose 
and in passing upon the same the district court of appeal said: 
" 'It is insisted that this court had no jurisdiction to remove 
Shepard's name from the roll of attorneys without notice. 
Under these sections for removal or sus-
are divided into two classes. 'rhc first of these in-
alone, based upon convictions of felonies 
or misdemeanors, involving moral turpitude. The second 
class includes two sub-classes, those proceedings to be 
taken for matters within the knowledge of the court, and, 
second, those which may be taken npon the information of 
anothcr. Certainly it appears to us1 whether notice is required 
[45 C.2d 
u:r•oce:edin~rs under both sub-classes of the second class or 
it not, it is clear that no notice is required in 
proceedings of the first class.' 
u ••• The same point arose in the case of In re Bloor, 21 
Mont. 49 [52 P. 779], under a statute taken bodily from our 
own code and in which the court said: 
" 'We believe no complaint or accusation in writing is 
necessary where an attorney or counselor has been convicted 
of a felony, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and 
where the record of conviction has been duly certified to this 
court. We also think that it is not necessary to issue or serve 
any citation upon an attorney or counselor, of proceedings 
to disbar him, where he has been convicted of a felony, or a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and where the record 
of his conviction has been duly certified to this court, before 
this court acts, where such record is the basis of the disbar-
ment proceedings. It is the bounden duty of such attorney 
so convicted, to know that the legal consequences of his con-
viction is his disbarment. There is no discretion in the 
supreme court, for it must proceed under section 418, Code 
Civ. Proc., on receipt of a certified copy of the record of 
conviction ; and by section 402, I d., the record of conviction 
is conclusive evidence.' " (See In 1·e Hallina;n, 43 Cal.2d 
243 [272 P.2d 768].) [7] It is clear therefore that plaintiff's 
constitutional rights were not violated and that where the 
mandatory duty is imposed on a board to revoke a license 
(credentials here) upon the conviction of the licensee of a 
specified crime no hearing by the board is required or con-
templated. A different problem is presented with respect 
to a hearing where the revocation is based on the conviction 
of a specified crime as was indicated in Ratliff v. Lampton, 
32 Cal.2d 226, 227 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826]: "We are 
not concerned with those provisions which make it mandatory 
upon the department to revoke or suspend the privilege of 
any person to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway upon 
receipt of a record showing that he has been convicted of 
certain specified offenses. {Veh. Code, §§ 304, 305, 307, 
315(a) (3).) In such cases the facts have already been 
determined in the criminal proceeding. A different situation 
is present, however, where, as here, the department must 
make an independent determination of facts as a basis for 
its action, and this was recognized by the Legislature in the 
detailed, albeit somewhat confusing, provisions o:f the 1945 
Oct. DIG-ENOvA v. STNrE BoARD EnucATION 263 
[45 C.2d 255; 288 P.2d 832] 
code relative to and 
revie\v~'' 
The dismissal of plaintiff by the San Francisco board 
followed as a matter of course the revocation of hi,., credentials 
because a governing board of a school district shall employ 
credentials only such who have 
(Ed. Code, 12001, 13001.) or 
vmuld appear to be required in such a case. 
The must be reversed but on retrial 
may show that the boards exceeded their m that 
the convictions were not those section 12756 
or that he was not the person convicted and thus obtain 
relief. Plaintiff argues those questions here but 
in the trial court he relied solely on the lack of notice and 
which was the basis of that court's decision. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-Upon the record in this case, I find no 
issue of fact to be determined upon a retrial. It is said in 
the majority opinion that ''on retrial plaintiff may show 
that the boards exceeded their authority in that the convic-
tions were not those contemplated by section 12756 or that 
he was not the person convicted and thus obtain appropriate 
relief. Plaintiff argues those questions here but in the trial 
court he relied solely on the lack of notice and hearing which 
was the basis of that court's decision." 
The first point, as conceded by the majority, presents "a 
question of law." All of the documents necessary to a deter-
mination of the nature of the crime of which DiGenova 
assertedly was convicted were received in evidence. \Vhether 
the convictions shown by those documents were ''sex offenses'' 
within the meaning of section 12756 of the Education Code 
involves no issue of fact, and the question may, and should 
be, decided upon this appeal. Insofar as lack of proof of 
identity is concerned, the petitioner has studiously avoided 
in petition, brief and arg'ument, making any claim that he 
•The local board may suspend a teacher on conviction of certain 
crimes but the teacher may have a he:uing if he demands it within 30 
days after notice of his sne]'GnG:nn: if he docs not dem~nd it he is 
dismissed. It is not clear here whether proper notice was given or a 
hearing demanded, 
is not the person who 
offenses shown in 
C.2d 
for hearing in this to evidence in 
the record sufficient to establish such a conviction. DiGenova 
in his answer to the 
tention that the 
was whether or 
revocation of his 
cence with reference 
lants, was not an issue in 
Trial Court.'' 
The burden of to show that the 
or unauthorized. (Sterling 
Corp. v. 207 Cal. 370, 373 [278 P. 859] ; 
Cook v. Reid, 39 Cal.App. 458 [183 P. 820]; Fraser v. 
Cummings, 48 Cal.App. 507 P. 100) ; "MacLeod v. 
Long, 110 Cal.App. ; Sevina v. Hickok, 
113 Cal.App. 301, 305 Nowhere in this pro-
ceeding has DiGenova asserted that he is not the person 
convicted or that the crimes involved are not sex offenses 
within the meaning of section 12756 of the Education Code. 
On the contrary, in response to from the bench at 
the hearing of this appeal as to whether DiGenova cleims 
that he is not the person who was convicted as charged, his 
counsel refused a direct answer. His reply was that the 
action of the board of education is challenged solely upon 
the ground that his client was denied notice and hearing as 
ailsertedly required 
The effect of the reversal is to remand the case 
for trial upon a petition which no sufficient ground 
for any relief, and where the respondent refuses to tender 
any issue of fact. For these reasons, I would reverse the 
judgment with the directions to the trial court to dismiss the 
petition for writ of mandate. 
